Gossip vs Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation

Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. 

To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. 

Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. 

Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation.

Below:  Relative effectiveness and efficiency of gossip and punishment in promoting and maintaining cooperation.

(a) Average contribution and (b) total earnings in the PGG, (c) trust, and (d) trustworthiness in the TG as a function of gossip and punishment manipulations. C = control condition with no gossip or punishment, P = punishment condition, G = gossip condition, GP = gossip-and-punishment condition. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.

Full article at:   http://goo.gl/s3w3PJ

By:  Wu J1, Balliet D1, Van Lange PA1.

• 1Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 
• Sci Rep. 2016 Apr 4;6:23919. doi: 10.1038/srep23919.

More at:  https://twitter.com/hiv insight

And: http://twitter.com/Prison Health

Children and Adults Use Physical Size and Numerical Alliances in Third-Party Judgments of Dominance

Humans and other social animals interact regularly with conspecifics as part of affiliative groups. Many of these interactions are cooperative, but many others involve competition for resources. Competitive exchanges are often resolved on the basis of dominance relationships, with higher-ranking individuals receiving priority access to desired goods. Although no single cue can establish permanent dominance relationships, there are some cues that predict dominance fairly reliably across context. In the present study, we focused on two such cues relevant to competing groups: (i) the physical sizes of individual members, and (ii) their relative number. 

Using a social competition task, we examined whether, and how, preschool-aged children and adults used differences in physical size and numerical alliances to judge which of two groups should prevail in a competitive exchange for a desired object. These judgments were made when either physical size or number differed between groups (Experiment 1), and when both were available but pitted against each other (Experiments 1 and 2). Our findings revealed that by 3 years of age, humans use multiple perceptible cues in third-party judgments of dominance. 

Our findings also revealed that 3-year-olds, like adults, weighted these cues flexibly according to the additional factor of overall group size, with the physical sizes of individuals determining dominance in smaller groups (e.g., 2 vs. 4 characters) and the relative number of individuals determining dominance in larger groups (e.g., 15 vs. 30 characters). 

Taken together, our findings suggest that a basic formula for determining dominance in competitive exchanges, which weights physical size of individuals and numerical alliances as a function of overall group size, is available to young children and appears fairly stable through to adulthood.

Below:  Performance in the Conflict condition for each age group in Experiment 1. Performance is plotted by group size: small (2 vs. 4 characters) and large (5 vs. 10 characters). As indicated in the main text, performance above 50% indicates that judgments were based on the physical sizes of the characters (size preference), whereas performance below 50% indicates that judgments were based on relative number (number preference). The dotted line indicates chance; that is, when neither physical size nor number was favored. Asterisks indicate significant differences from chance. Error bars are ±1 SEM.

Full article at:   http://goo.gl/Fb22ro

By:  Stella F. Lourenco,1,* Justin W. Bonny,2 and Bari L. Schwartz1

¹Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

²Department of Psychology, California State University, San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA, USA

Edited by: Emily Mather, University of Hull, UK

Reviewed by: Carmelo Mario Vicario, Bangor University, UK; Victoria Simms, Ulster University, UK

*Correspondence: Stella F. Lourenco, ude.yrome@ocneruol.allets

More at:  https://twitter.com/hiv insight

And: http://twitter.com/Prison Health

Inter-Group Conflict & Cooperation: Field Experiments Before, During & After Sectarian Riots in Northern Ireland

The idea that cooperative groups out-compete less cooperative groups has been proposed as a theoretical possibility for the evolution of cooperation through cultural group selection. Previous studies have found an association between increased cooperation and exposure to inter-group violence, but most have not been able to identify the specific target of cooperation and are based on correlational data making it difficult to establish causality. 

In this study we test the hypothesis that inter-group conflict promotes parochial altruism (i.e., in-group altruism and out-group hostility) by using longitudinal data of a real-world measure of cooperation-charity and school donations-sampled before, during and after violent sectarian riots between Catholics and Protestants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. 

We find that conflict is associated with reductions in all types of cooperation, with reduced donations to a neutral charity, and both in-group and out-group primary schools. After the conflict, both in-group and out-group donations increased again. In this context we find no evidence that inter-group conflict promotes parochial altruism.

Below:  Map of Belfast with the neighborhoods Ballymacarrett 1 and Bellevue 2 in green and the 4 primary schools used in the donations experiments before, during and after the sectarian riots. Catholic primary schools (green markers) and Protestant primary schools (red markers).

Below:  Predicted donations by type over time. Predicted value (£) of an individual donating to the neutral charity Save the Children, an in-group primary school, an out-group primary school and all combined donations over time (before, during, and after the riots). These predicted values are controlled for individual household income, educational level, age, gender and religion. Error bars represent the standard errors.

Full article at:   http://goo.gl/mfidL5

By:   Silva AS1, Mace R1.

• 1Department of Anthropology, University College London London, UK. 

More at:  https://twitter.com/hiv_insight

And: http://twitter.com/Prison_Health

Collective Punishment Is More Effective Than Collective Reward for Promoting Cooperation

Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective. 

To address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment is more effective in promoting cooperation for a relatively high initial frequency of cooperation or for a relatively small group. When the intensity of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, a stable state of full cooperation emerges for both small and large groups. In contrast, such state does not appear for large groups playing a NESG with reward mechanism. 

In the case of mutualistic interactions, finally, our results show the new payoff with collective punishment/reward can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and defectors when discrimination between these two is not possible.

Full article at:  http://goo.gl/KZR0sD

By:  Gao L1,2,3, Wang Z1,4, Pansini R5, Li YT3, Wang RW1,5.

• 1Center for Ecological and Environmental Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, P.R. China.
• 2School of Mathematics and Information Science, Beifang University of Nationalities, Yinchuan, 750021, P.R. China.
• 3School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming, Yunnan, 650091, P.R. China.
• 4Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan.
• 5State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, Yunnan, 650223, P.R. China. 

More at:  https://twitter.com/hiv_insight

And:        http://twitter.com/Prison_Health

Personality, Parasites, Political Attitudes, and Cooperation: A Model of How Infection Prevalence Influences Openness and Social Group Formation

What is the origin of individual differences in ideology and personality? According to the parasite stress hypothesis, the structure of a society and the values of individuals within it are both influenced by the prevalence of infectious disease within the society's geographical region. High levels of infection threat are associated with more ethnocentric and collectivist social structures and greater adherence to social norms, as well as with socially conservative political ideology and less open but more conscientious personalities. 

Here we use an agent-based model to explore a specific opportunities-parasites trade-off (OPTO) hypothesis, according to which utility-maximizing agents place themselves at an optimal point on a trade-off between (a) the gains that may be achieved through accessing the resources of geographically or socially distant out-group members through openness to out-group interaction, and (b) the losses arising due to consequently increased risks of exotic infection to which immunity has not been developed. 

We examine the evolution of cooperation and the formation of social groups within social networks, and we show that the groups that spontaneously form exhibit greater local rather than global cooperative networks when levels of infection are high. It is suggested that the OPTO model offers a first step toward understanding the specific mechanisms through which environmental conditions may influence cognition, ideology, personality, and social organization.

Below:  Effects of learning on openness for different values of the probability of infection associated with most distant neighbors

Full article at:  http://goo.gl/8IUg6L

By:  Brown GD1, Fincher CL1, Walasek L1.

• 1Department of Psychology, University of Warwick. 

More at:  https://twitter.com/hiv_insight

And:        http://twitter.com/Prison_Health