Collective punishment and
reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the
evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to
understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order
free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less
cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase
cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective.
To
address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game
(NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing
some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By
means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment
is more effective in promoting cooperation for a relatively high initial
frequency of cooperation or for a relatively small group. When the intensity of
punishment exceeds a certain threshold, a stable state of full cooperation
emerges for both small and large groups. In contrast, such state does not
appear for large groups playing a NESG with reward mechanism.
In the case of
mutualistic interactions, finally, our results show the new payoff with
collective punishment/reward can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and
defectors when discrimination between these two is not possible.
Full article at:
- 1Center for Ecological and Environmental Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, P.R. China.
- 2School of Mathematics and Information Science, Beifang University of Nationalities, Yinchuan, 750021, P.R. China.
- 3School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming, Yunnan, 650091, P.R. China.
- 4Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan.
- 5State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, Yunnan, 650223, P.R. China.
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