How Government Coordination Controlled Organized Crime: The Case of Mexico’s Cocaine Markets

This article provides empirical evidence showing that when a multilevel government is well coordinated, organized crime can be more effectively controlled. 

Using a time-variant data set of Mexico’s cocaine markets at the subnational level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions, I show that when Mexico’s democratization decreased the probability of government coordination—the same party governing a municipality at every level of government—drug traffickers were more likely to violate the long-standing informal prohibition on selling cocaine within the country. 

It was this decrease in government coordination that would set the conditions for a violent war between drug cartels to erupt in the mid-2000s.

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By:   Viridiana Rios1⇑

1. ¹Research Fellow at Harvard University’s David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Mexico City, Mexico

1. Viridiana Rios, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA. Email: vrios@post.harvard.edu

 

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