Showing posts with label judgments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judgments. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 10, 2016

Boldness and Its Relation to Psychopathic Personality: Prototypicality Analyses among Forensic Mental Health, Criminal Justice, and Layperson Raters

Research on psychopathic personality has been dominated by a focus on criminality and social deviance, but some theoretical models argue that certain putatively adaptive features are important components of this construct. In 3 samples (forensic mental health practitioners, probation officers and a layperson community sample), we investigated adaptive traits as conceptualized in the Triarchic model of psychopathy (Patrick et al., 2009), specifically the relevance of boldness to construals of psychopathic personality. 

Participants completed prototypicality ratings of psychopathic traits, including 3 items created to tap components of boldness (Socially bold, Adventurous, Emotionally stable), and they also rated a series of attitudinal statements (e.g., perceived correlates of being psychopathic, moral judgments about psychopaths). 

The composite Boldness scale was rated as moderately to highly prototypical among forensic mental health practitioners and probation officers and positively associated with other theoretically relevant domains of psychopathy. Across samples, higher composite Boldness ratings predicted greater endorsement of adaptive traits (e.g., social skills) as characteristic of psychopathy. For the individual items, Socially bold was rated as highly prototypical and was associated with theoretically relevant correlates. Adventurous also was seen as prototypical, though to a lesser degree. Only forensic mental health practitioners endorsed Emotionally stable as characteristic of psychopathy. 

Our results provide partial support for the contention that the boldness concept is viewed as an important component of psychopathy, particularly among professionals who work directly with offender populations. 

Purchase full article at:   http://goo.gl/QHO1cE





Saturday, December 26, 2015

Latent Fairness in Adults’ Relationship-Based Moral Judgments

Can adults make fair moral judgments when individuals with whom they have different relationships are involved? The present study explored the fairness of adults’ relationship-based moral judgments in two respects by performing three experiments involving 999 participants. In Experiment 1, 65 adults were asked to decide whether to harm a specific person to save five strangers in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas in a within-subject design. The lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a person they disliked, a criminal or a stranger. Adults’ genetic relatedness to, familiarity with and affective relatedness to the lone potential victims varied. 

The results indicated that adults made different moral judgments involving the lone potential victims with whom they had different relationships. In Experiment 2, 306 adults responded to the footbridge and trolley dilemmas involving five types of lone potential victims in a within-subject design, and the extent to which they were familiar with and affectively related to the lone potential victim was measured. 

The results generally replicated those of Experiment 1. In addition, for close individuals, adults’ moral judgments were less deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive affect toward these individuals. For individuals they were not close to, adults made deontological choices to a larger extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or negative affect toward these individuals. 

Moreover, for familiar individuals, the extent to which adults made deontological moral judgments more closely approximated the extent to which they were familiar with the individual. The adults’ deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar individuals more closely approximated their affective relatedness to the individuals. 

In Experiment 3, 628 adults were asked to make moral judgments with the type of lone potential victim as the between-subject variable. The results generally replicated those of the previous two experiments. 

Therefore, the present study shows that, in addition to apparent unfairness, latent fairness exists in adults’ relationship-based moral judgments. Moral judgments involving individuals with whom adults have different relationships have different cognitive and affective bases.

Below:  Percentages of participants who decided to harm a lone potential victim to save five strangers from being hurt in Experiment 1


Below:  Percentages of participants who decided to harm a lone potential victim to save five strangers from death in Experiment 2



Full article at:   http://goo.gl/568FgE

By:   Jian Hao,1 Yanchun Liu,2,* and Jiafeng Li3
1Beijing Key Laboratory of Learning and Cognition, Department of Psychology, College of Education, Capital Normal University, Beijing, China
2Youth Work Department, China Youth University of Political Studies, Beijing, China
3Psychological Education and Counseling Center, Office of Student Affairs, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, China
Edited by: Shira Elqayam, De Montfort University, UK
Reviewed by: Briony D. Pulford, University of Leicester, UK; Bastien Trémolière, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada
*Correspondence: Yanchun Liu, moc.361@4891_nuhcnayuil
  


Tuesday, December 8, 2015

When Minds Matter for Moral Judgment: Intent Information is Neurally Encoded for Harmful But Not Impure Acts

Recent behavioral evidence indicates a key role for intent in moral judgments of harmful acts (e.g., assault) but not impure acts (e.g., incest). We tested whether the neural responses in regions for mental state reasoning, including the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), are greater when people evaluate harmful versus impure violations. 

In addition, using multi-voxel pattern analysis, we investigated whether the voxel-wise pattern in these regions distinguishes intentional from accidental actions, for either kind of violation. The RTPJ was preferentially recruited in response to harmful versus impure acts. Moreover, although its response was equally high for intentional and accidental acts, the voxel-wise pattern in the RTPJ distinguished intentional from accidental acts in the harm domain but not the purity domain. 

Finally, we found that the degree to which the RTPJ discriminated between intentional and accidental acts predicted the impact of intent information on moral judgments, but again only in the harm domain. 

These findings reveal intent to be a uniquely critical factor for moral evaluations of harmful versus impure acts, and shed light on the neural computations for mental state reasoning.

Purchase full article at:  http://goo.gl/9VljPh

  • 1. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA alekchakroff@gmail.com.
  • 2. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.
  • 3. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
  • 4. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.