Prior theory suggests that
reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to
promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined
their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining
cooperation.
To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a
four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment
options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as
the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future
partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce
other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3.
Findings
revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both
cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall
effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two
rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings.
Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and
trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared
to the no-gossip condition.
Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip
may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain
cooperation.
Below: Relative effectiveness and
efficiency of gossip and punishment in promoting and maintaining cooperation.
(a) Average contribution and (b) total earnings in the PGG,
(c) trust, and (d) trustworthiness in the TG as a function of gossip and
punishment manipulations. C = control condition with no gossip or punishment,
P = punishment condition, G = gossip condition, GP = gossip-and-punishment
condition. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Full article at: http://goo.gl/s3w3PJ
By: Wu J1, Balliet D1, Van Lange PA1.
- 1Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
- Sci Rep. 2016 Apr 4;6:23919. doi: 10.1038/srep23919.
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